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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the systematic police killings of young, male 
crime suspects by local police officers in Mathare since 2002. It 
explores the relationship between executions of young ghetto men 
by police and notions of citizenship. It firstexmaines the impact of 
such killings on positions of manhood among these men and the 
different roles of ‘gangs’ in popular processes of becoming men. My 
aim is to move away from the current association of young ghetto 
men with violence and ethnic politics—i.e. as ‘thugs for hire’. One 
of my main discoveries was that work and manhood are at least as 
important to grasp processes of group formation among them. After 
this, the article delves into the question of how to understand the 
narratives that legitimise and perpetuate this particular form of state 
violence. It concludes by discussing how processes of subjectivation 
that constitute, and are constituted by, the dominant discourse on 
citizenship produce positions of non-citizenship ascribed to ghetto 
residents, and in particular to young ghetto men.
Introduction
On 17 October 2013, as I left the University of Amsterdam, my phone bleeped. The What’s App 
message from a friend in Kenya stated: ‘How are you Siz? Now it is dangerous and hectic in the 
ghetto. Three guys were shot dead by police. Silas is one of them, so shocked and sad’. My knees 
gave in. Then my phone bleeped, and bleeped and bleeped again. My stomach churned as I slowly 
grasped the horror of this fact. I pictured Silas’ sweet face, a young man whom I had known since 
his childhood. What had happened? After days of shock and talking with friends in Kenya who 
had witnessed the murders, I was able to get a clearer image of what had transpired in Mathare, 
a Nairobi ghetto, that ill-fated Thursday afternoon.
Silas and two of his friends sat near a stone tenement building in Mathare, chatting and relaxing 
with a cold soda in the dark yellow warmth of the late-afternoon sun. The dirt road where they 
hung out was busy with women selling vegetables and children playing in their school uniforms. 
Suddenly, two known police officers showed up in dustcoats concealing their guns, and they 
started shooting at the three young men without any warning. Afterwards, the two police officers 
placed knives, a fake gun and other weaponry on the young men, and controlled the scene until 
the press arrived hours later.1
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Shockingly, the murder of these three young men by the police was not a first or single 
event. In fact, such assassinations by the police have taken the lives of thousands of young 
men over the past decade in Kenya. The most common explanation by Mathare residents 
of why the police continue to shoot crime suspects instead of taking them to court relates 
to the widely held ineffectiveness of and corruption within the judiciary system. According 
to many residents, special police units (popularly called ‘death squads’)2 work together with 
local informants to kill suspects in attempts to curb crime.3 Interestingly, many residents 
also shared other reasons for such executions with me. For instance, a young self-proclaimed 
thief explained to me in early February 2016 that police officers at times collaborate with 
local thieves. He said: ‘If the risk gets too high police officers can just kill the thief to pro-
tect themselves’. Such partnerships are not as far-fetched as one might think at first glance, 
seeing that the police are also heavily, and quite openly, involved in the illegal alcohol and 
drugs trade. Many policemen who execute criminal suspects are known locally by name, but 
investigations are generally blocked. Family and friends who try to gain more information 
and pursue these cases are often threatened. As a result, local activists from, for instance, 
the Mathare Social Justice Centre who try to document and prepare evidence for court 
cases against individual police officers meet great difficulty in convincing witnesses to come 
forward.4 To date only a few cases of police brutality have actually reached court, despite 
the fact that according to these local activists said cases represent hundreds and hundreds 
of extra-judicial killings of crime suspects in Mathare that occurred over the past decade.
To give an indication, executions of crime suspects by the police have led to the death of at 
least one young man from Mathare, a Nairobi ghetto,5 per week on average between January 
2013 and December 2015.6 Hence, conservative estimates put the number of extra-judicial 
executions in this period at 150 in Mathare alone. Since January 2016, such killings seem to 
be on the rise again. I was in Kenya and worked together with local activists to document 
16 police killings of young men from Mathare between 1 January and 18 February 2016. 
In comparison, activists in Korogocho, another Nairobi ghetto notorious for crime, have 
estimated that police officers have murdered around 25 young men in 2015. I do not have 
such assessments from other areas in Nairobi or nationwide, but I do have information 
from activists on the ground in different localities that similar killings occur systematically 
in various parts of Kenya.
This article focuses on the systematic police killings of young, male crime suspects by 
local police officers in Mathare since 2002.7 It explores the relationship between executions 
of young ghetto men by the police and notions of citizenship by first giving a background 
to this type of police violence. In the first section, I discuss the different attentions the three 
main groups of victims—i.e. Mungiki, terrorist and crime suspects—have received from 
human rights organisations over the years. Then, I continue to explore the impact of police 
killings of crime suspects on positions of manhood among young ghetto men, and discuss 
the different roles of ‘gangs’ in popular processes of becoming men. My aim is to move away 
from the current association of young ghetto men with violence and ethnic politics—i.e. 
as ‘thugs for hire’. One of my main discoveries was that work and manhood are at least 
as important to grasp processes of group formation among them. After this, the article 
delves into the question how to understand the processes that legitimise and perpetuate 
this particular form of state violence. By taking a closer look at the framing of the notion 
‘gang’ in media and other discourses, it examines the master narratives of fear and threat 
that justify these killings. It concludes by discussing how processes of subjectivation8 that 
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT  303
constitute, and are constituted by, the dominant discourse on citizenship produce positions 
of non-citizenship ascribed to ghetto residents, and in particular to young ghetto men.
Mungiki, Al Shabaab and crime-related extra-judicial killings
Human rights activists observed an upward trend in extra-judicial killings of young, urban 
and poor men by the police during the 1990s, with as many as four to five deaths a week in 
1998.9 These unlawful killings rose dramatically from 2002, declined slightly after 2008, only 
to rise again after the General Elections held on 3 March 2013.10 The first increase between 
2002 and 2008 corresponds with the nationwide government crackdown on Mungiki. In 
this period, the Kenyan police are reported to have killed over 8,000 young and poor men,11 
many of whom had no affiliation to said group.12 The current rise since 2013 correlates with 
growing terrorist threats, heightened political tensions between the government and the 
opposition and with the securitisation of the state.13 Hence, fluctuations in executions of 
Mungiki, terrorist and crime suspects by the police to a large extent connect to broader polit-
ical dynamics, with young men living in ghettos such as Mathare often bearing the brunt.
Several reports have highlighted unlawful killings in relation to Mungiki14 and to Al 
Shabaab.15 Yet, the systematic executions of young ghetto men suspected of crime largely go 
unnoticed even if these seem to constitute a great number of the total. Independent Medico 
Legal Unit (IMLU), for instance, reported 126 deaths by police bullets between January and 
December 2015,16 and this figure may include the different groups of victims—this is not 
always clear from the case descriptions. Nevertheless, it seems a rather low number if we take 
into account that local activists counted approximately 50 executions in Mathare alone in 
the same period, whereas this ghetto is just one of many locations in which such executions 
occur.17 During discussions, since 2010, with different human rights organisations in Kenya, 
staff members have repeatedly admitted to me that they are aware that reported numbers of 
police killings by their organisations only represent the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Many pointed to 
a lack of systematic documentation on police killings and to a lack of substantial evidence 
in the few cases that were reported to them. Both derive from the extreme risks involved.18
The dangers involved in documenting and reporting police killings to human rights 
organisations for witnesses and activists on the ground applies to data collection on all three 
groups of victims. This tells us that despite courageous efforts, the reports on police killings 
of Mungiki and terrorist suspects perhaps may also not be comprehensive. To illustrate the 
risks, the Director of the Oscar Foundation and his colleague were mysteriously killed on 
State House Road in Nairobi early 2009 after they had spearheaded a demonstration against 
extra-judicial killings of alleged Mungiki members.19 These executions sent a rather chill-
ing message to activists protesting against particular police practices, and deterred many 
from gathering more substantial data on police killings.20 However, another reason behind 
the lack of reporting on police killings of crime suspects—as opposed to Mungiki and Al 
Shabaab suspects—by such organisations hinges on the ‘normalisation’ of their executions, 
as illustrated by the rather ‘casual’ media reporting and an absolute lack of public outcry 
over such executions.
Despite the persecutions of human rights activists, the reports by Oscar Foundation and 
Alston,21 together with the widespread outrage over the police response to the post-elec-
tion violence of 2007–2008,22 did prompt the police reforms that are currently underway 
in Kenya23—even if reluctantly24 and rather ineffectively.25 Extra-judicial executions of 
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(mostly) young and poor men by the police continued nonetheless, and, as mentioned, even 
increased. Overtime, the more visible target group changed from Mungiki to Al Shabaab. 
Following the nationwide government crackdown most Mungiki groups effectively ceased 
to exist by 2008. Since then, terrorist attacks allegedly organised by Al Shabaab have been 
on the rise. The police shifted attention from Mungiki to Al Shaabab terrorist suspects and 
prominent Muslim leaders, and public focus and human rights organisations followed this 
move. Away from this attention, however, criminal suspects remained a target throughout, 
even if their murders did rise and fall in connection to such broader events. For example, 
the growing terrorist threat prompted the highly controversial Operation Usalama Watch 
in April 2014, which targeted thousands of people with Somali backgrounds in Eastleigh.26 
The ensuing chaos, night raids, increased demands for bribes, mass arrests and harassment 
of all residents and the killings of terrorist suspects by the police in this neighbourhood 
spilled over to nearby Mathare. Local activists observed an immediate rise in executions 
of crime suspects here by the police.27
Shockingly, ‘shoot-to-kill’ orders are issued on a regular basis,28 without any actual legal 
framework to corroborate them,29 and this hardly ever raises public concern. The perpet-
uation of the killings of crime suspects by the police, despite attempts at police reforms,30 
tentatively tells us two things. First, the government and by extension the police deem 
shooting an effective and justified approach to curb crime.31 This line of thinking frames 
such executions as an effective means of getting rid of active thieves and deterring emerging 
ones. Second, the lack of public outcry over these killings tells us that the wider public seems 
to buy into the legitimating narratives that these young men embody an imminent threat 
to society at large and to police officers in particular. Hence, shooting young and poor men 
who are suspected of being thieves is considered quite legitimate within the public domain. 
This all begs the question of how the systematic unlawful killings of crime suspects by the 
police affects the young, poor and urban men who feel under siege.
The last man standing
In late 2010, Kingi, a 34-year-old father of two, told me that most of his friends had been 
thieves at the time when he became a father at the age of 19. ‘Many of my friends, when 
I was young, they were thieves, now they have been shot by police, some are also killed 
by mob-justice and chang’aa—illegal alcohol—but most by police’. He named 23 friends 
during our discussions, and I knew half of them. He shared with me that he had witnessed 
some of these killings, and had also been nearly killed by a police bullet on more than one 
occasion. Our talk on unlawful killings was sparked by the murder of his cousin. He had 
just received a phone call from his aunt who had told him that they had finally found the 
body of his 25-year-old cousin, Kuch, who had been missing for over a week.
Kingi’s cousin Kuch had been tortured and shot dead by police officers. He had been 
killed during the night of 23 October 2010, ostensibly after being suspected of a robbery 
in Ngara, Nairobi. He had been in the company of a friend who had narrowly escaped the 
sudden spray of police bullets. This friend had spoken to Kingi on the phone and told him 
that he had witnessed from afar how Kuch had succumbed to the gunfire and had even 
been slashed with machetes before going limp. Kuch’s mutilated body had eventually been 
discarded in City Park, allegedly by the police officers who had killed him. Other officers had 
found his body early on a Sunday morning. Upon receiving the dreadful news from Kuch’s 
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friend, his mother and aunt, Kingi’s sister, had hurried to the local police station where 
they were told to try the different mortuaries in Nairobi to locate the body. After checking 
several facilities, they eventually discovered the body at the City Mortuary underneath a 
heap of anonymous corpses in various stages of decomposition. The horror of his cousin’s 
death and the way his female relatives had found his body provoked immense anger in Kingi.
On Sunday 31 October 2010, a week after Kuch’s death, Kingi and I were walking towards 
his aunt’s house in Kayole—a poor neighbourhood in Eastlands, Nairobi—to attend a meet-
ing organised to raise funds for the funeral. Before entering the matanga—‘a funeral fund 
raising meeting’ in Kiswahili—Kingi suddenly took my arm, pulled me aside and said 
in a strained voice: ‘I can't do anything today, I will be all right tomorrow. I first have to 
settle my mind, but now it disturbs me, my head is so full’. A faint smile appeared on his 
grief-stricken face, but his jaw tightened, trying to hold back his emotions in an attempt 
to compose himself before facing his family inside the one-room house. As one of the few 
men of his age still alive in his family, he shared with me that he wanted to ‘be strong and 
focused’. Some of his uncles and cousins had died from alcohol abuse, AIDS-related illnesses 
or police bullets, and he expressed the need to be a ‘leader’ in his family.
They look up to me. Most of my family is women, some men died, some men, they went away. 
I need to show them we can arrange this funeral. Okay, he was a thief, not an innocent [...] but 
they [police] don’t have to shoot you. Why not go to court? In mtaa [‘ghetto’ in Sheng32] you can 
only become a thief or a distiller, or both. Me, when I was young, I admired thieves, thieves had 
too much pesa [‘money’ in Kiswahili], I looked up to them, I wanted their money, but Shosho 
scared me. Saying so and so is in jail, so and so died. That scared me. I did not have friends who 
thought not to steal [...] they steal mostly in Mathare, they are from a different category who steal 
inside than thugs who steal outside mtaa. Like Kuch. Shosho gave me a job, and that made me 
not to steal, also her advice, she helped me a lot.
Not many young men enjoyed the support of a stern grandmother the way Kingi had, 
a caring but strict grandmother who was also able to provide him with job opportunities. 
Kingi’s grandmother was a known illegal alcohol distiller and seller in the ghetto, and even 
if she was not at all wealthy, she earned enough to employ her grandson from the age of 
12. According to Kingi, this saved him from becoming a thief and risk getting killed by the 
police. However, he felt a growing burden of responsibilities with regard to his extended 
family as more and more men died and left women and children behind. He said: ‘I don’t 
want to be the last man standing, […] I don’t have a father, my uncle is dead. My grandfather, 
he is also dead. Now, my cousin died. Many friends, they died’.
Age-sets and achieving manhood
The 40 young men I conducted research with in Bondeni and Kosovo, Mathare, all responded 
to being cast as ‘dangerous criminals’ by investing a lot of energy and time in adhering to 
popular notions of manhood,33 such as the provider, like Kingi.34 The tenacity with which 
these men adhered to this hegemonic standard of masculinity against all odds stemmed from 
a desire to still feel in charge. Many young men in Mathare grew up without a father, but 
nevertheless harboured ideas of manhood that defined men as future heads of households 
and main breadwinners for, and protectors of, women and children.35
Interestingly, the provider is popularly imagined as the embodiment of ‘traditional 
African masculinity’ in the dominant discourse, yet this notion emerged during the colonial 
era in response to changes wrought by government policies. The rise of wage labour and 
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overpopulation in the Native Reserves had a profound impact on existing gender roles.36 
Women were less and less able to feed their families with what they produced on the fam-
ily farms. Subsistence farm work is still generally taken as female labour in Kenya, and in 
pre-colonial times was one of the ways women contributed to the survival of their families. 
However, land became a growing problem within the confines of these reserves. As a con-
sequence, families became increasingly dependent on the money, mostly, men were able to 
earn as migrant workers on, for instance, European farms. As a result, a new social value 
system developed that bestowed on men in particular new obligations and responsibilities. 
This was epitomised by the imaginary of the provider.37 What this imaginary entailed in 
precise terms was constantly redefined in relation to ever shifting contexts, yet it continued 
to centre on male responsibilities. This was especially the case in the urban area, as women 
often continued to practise subsistence farming rurally, which shaped different notions of 
the provider. These changes, especially in the urban contexts, do not withstand the fact 
that ‘the provider’ predominantly remained a male position, including in rural contexts. 
Interestingly, among young, urban professional couples in Nairobi who earned comparable 
salaries, the male provider role continued to shape gender relations, which continues to be 
affirmed by both men and women.38
In struggling to live up to this masculine ideal, most young men in Mathare carried 
multiple burdens and tried to take care of a grandmother, a mother, several sisters, a wife 
and children. Labelled merely ‘dangerous criminals’ in dominant discourse, and obstructed 
from social and economic opportunities to establish themselves as men in society, marriage 
and family were often considered by them as the last domains where they could still try and 
claim power. Accordingly, adhering to the role of the provider was paramount among their 
ambitions. The epitome of the provider, which continued to be perpetuated and affirmed 
by both women and men within the ghetto, stood in stark contrast with the fact that most 
households in Mathare were actually run and provided for by women. Female sex workers 
founded Bondeni—and a few other localities in Mathare—during the 1930s.39 In contrast 
to women, men who came to the city during the colonial era in search of work could often 
return to the rural area because they could inherit land, which women often could not. 
As a result, female-headed households have dominated Mathare, and especially Bondeni 
since the outset, and the first and second generation of female sex workers have built the 
illegal alcohol industry here.40 Many young men in Bondeni and Kosovo worked for them, 
and only a few became bosses themselves. Becoming a man in these ghetto localities thus 
involved the relentless pursuit of unattainable ideals, and engaging in relationships with 
women that were irrefutably fraught with contradictions, confusion, diminishing control 
and concomitant anxieties.
Local networks of men, often termed ‘gangs’ in dominant discourses, provided them 
with access to legal and illegal social and economic opportunities and brotherhood.41 The 
networks I worked with were involved in illegal alcohol distilling, brokering stolen goods, 
providing security and dealing heroin, and these rather fluid groups were often dubbed com-
panies by their members,42 see more below. These companies were one of the few spaces, in 
and outside the ghetto, where their members were able to enact manhood, claim status and 
exert some kind of power. Yet, despite the opportunities these rather fluid groups offered, 
they also posed an inexorable problem to their membership, for they were locally imagined 
as age-sets of junior manhood. Subsequently, membership was considered appropriate for 
men only within a certain age-bracket. The local category ‘junior man’ is a rather fluid 
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notion that is not based on biological age per se. This category has to be understood as a 
context-bound social and political position, which is loosely founded on reconfigured and 
mythologised notions of ‘traditional age-sets’ and generational transformations of power.43
The local discourse on manhood held that men were expected to leave these companies, 
and the work these were engaged in, around their early 30s to take up their role as ‘senior 
men’ and thus become fully recognised men and members of society. Among other things, 
this entailed an expectation that they were to be economically independent and act as heads 
of their extended families. Thus, male, junior workers were expected to gradually take up 
responsibilities widely associated with being the provider. Hence, the socio-economic posi-
tion of these young men as workers did not correspond with hegemonic masculine ideals. 
These companies were imagined as an age-set that enabled young men to acquire skills and 
social, economic and cultural capital44 to increasingly prepare for senior manhood. They 
were meant to help workers in eventually becoming company bosses (in alcohol distillation 
or dealing drugs) or otherwise independent business owners, and thus establish themselves 
as full providers and heads of their households. Kingi, for instance, left the company he 
founded while working for his grandmother (an influential alcohol boss) when he became a, 
rather minor, alcohol boss himself. Accordingly, leaving the company was an inherent part 
of becoming a fully recognised man. Yet, the blatant ramifications of protracted economic 
crisis obstructed many young men from garnering sufficient social and economic capital to 
leave the company and become independent providers; hence they became trapped in a state 
of ‘junior manhood’. The inability to leave and establish themselves according to popular 
notions of manhood exacerbated their shared sense of ‘being stuck’—or in ‘prison’ as some 
of these young ghetto men put it. This feeling of ‘being stuck’ resonates strongly with the 
conceptualisation of ‘social death’ by Vigh,45 and this fear of ‘social death’ was exacerbated 
exponentially by the growing threat of police executions.
‘We men live in a warzone’
A young drugs dealer from Mathare called Malik described how he saw his cousin chased 
and then killed by a policeman in July 2009:
They [policemen] came, just like that, to get him. He ran and they chased him to St. T [near Juja 
road]. They forced him to kneel down. I saw him beg for his life. They just shot him through the 
head, executed him, from behind. It was very busy and many people were looking. That is how 
he died, in the line of duty.46
The shared fears of not growing older than 25, thus never being able to achieve physical 
and social maturity and old age, highly affected the social praxis of, and choice-making by, 
many young ghetto men. All young men from Mathare I met and worked with expressed 
the fear brought out in the above by Kingi, of remaining the last man standing or, worse, of 
dying before becoming a father and a grandfather. Numerous young men told me that they 
desperately wanted to become a father in order to leave their mark—a ‘mini-me’—before 
they die. This shows that social suffering was complexly gendered in Mathare. Being a 
police target solely for being young men living in a Nairobi ghetto impinged heavily on their 
gendered senses of the self. As said, Kingi had lost 23 close friends in the span of a decade, 
and told me how he felt about being a young man and father in Mathare:
I think it was 2004 and also 2008, we had mazishi [a funeral in Kiswahili] every week. But also in 
2002, yes [...] it started earlier. So many of us were shot dead by karao ['a policeman' in Sheng], so 
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many! It is like, what? [...] you know him and him, and you work together rowe [‘at the riverside’ 
in the Kikuyu language, where illegal alcohol is made], and the next week he is a dead. Many 
guys who were in my football team, also they died. I showed you the picture. From us, only five 
are alive [...] Ok, some were not innocent, but they are shot dead, not brought to court. And you 
saw it with Kuch, it still happens. [...] All men in ghetto have been in cell, all of us, ha ha ha you 
are not a man if you have not been in cell. When there is a msako [‘a police raid’ in Sheng], we 
have to hide, they [police] can ask you to lala chini [‘lie face down on the ground’ in Sheng], they 
peremba [‘pickpocket’ in Sheng] you, they take your things, and when they are not happy with 
what they find, they can just take you to Centa [a ground in Eastleigh, a neighbourhood near 
Mathare, where many young men have been executed] to shoot you, just like that. We are not 
safe, even if we are innocent, they will shoot you. They can place a fake gun on you, and put a 
report that you are a thief. A thief has 40 days,47 but what about me? How many days do I have? 
My son? Here in ghetto, we men […] we live in a warzone.
During a more recent conversation in May 2015, he said that it is much more frightening 
to raise a son than a daughter in the ghetto. Every night, he fears that his 17-year-old son 
might be arrested by the police, solely for being a young man in the ghetto. In early February 
2016, I observed that he and his wife even locked their son inside their small house for two 
days when a close friend of his son was shot dead by the police at a funeral gathering. He 
shared: ‘You know, Victa, he is tall, handsome, and has good clothes, now he is finished 
school. How can a boy from the ghetto, look so good? That is what police think, he must 
be a […]? A thief! So they can just shoot him, like they shot his friend’.
Ghetto men’s fear, and ensuing frustrations, sparked by a deep anxiety of never achieving 
senior manhood and becoming superfluous, does not only hinge on a lack of belonging 
within society at large and on the inability to live up to hegemonic standards of masculinity 
within what they term ‘their community’. The clear and present danger of being murdered 
by the police, voiced rather poignantly here by Kingi, informs a gendered sense of the self 
in which young men feel as if they stand clearly apart from other social groups, such as 
women, girls and older men sharing the same intersecting ethnic and socio-economic posi-
tions. Kingi stated that young men, not women, girls or even older men, ‘lived in a warzone’. 
Many young men from the ghetto thus feel hunted, obstructed and discriminated against.
Representations of gangs
In the dominant discourse, the young, poor and urban men which are the focus of this 
article are all cast as ‘dangerous criminals’ belonging to ‘gangs’. The above shows that a 
different reality appears if we look more closely at the groups often referred to as ‘gangs’. 
Still, the term ‘gang’ and concomitant stereotypes of perpetrators of violence continue to 
inform narratives of threat that fall onto fertile soil among the urban middle class. This begs 
the questions: What was imagined as a ‘gang’ in the public domain, and why did this term 
justify state violence against young, male bodies?
The term ‘gang’ features regularly in media representations in Kenya, but the social 
phenomena it is assumed to describe are more often than not opaque, disparate and highly 
contradictory. For instance, this term may denote a wide range of groups such as ‘thugs for 
hire’, terrorists or militias—the latter are often described as ‘tribal’ groups with a purported 
political agenda48—or groups of ‘thugs’ who rob houses and hijack cars,49 but also ‘cartells’ 
who control the delivery of services, such as electricity, sanitation and water, in ghetto 
neighbourhoods.50 Obviously, this is just a sample for these lists are endless, yet it gives us 
an indication that the term ‘gang’ with regard to the Kenyan context means different things 
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in different situations and to different people. However, stating that the term is contingent, 
its application ambiguous and inconsistent, and that the phenomena it generally is assumed 
to describe are highly ephemeral, hardly does justice to the shocking reality of thousands 
of dead bodies killed by the police under its guise.
What is more, said media representations often explained the alleged susceptibility of 
young ghetto men to political manipulation by using the term ‘idle’. Describing young and 
poor men in this way, and therefore as dangerous, is an often-heard repertoire in Kenya when 
it comes to explaining political violence and other social ills that are ostensibly perpetrated 
by young and poor men.51 Nevertheless, most of the young men I worked with can hardly be 
described as idle; they woke up early to look for work (long-term arrangements) or hustling 
(short-term activities), and would often not return home before nine in the evening, thus 
spending a total of 18 h out on the street to make themselves available whenever opportu-
nities arose. Such pervasive stereotypes, however, continue because of a lack of knowledge, 
even if these are to some extent informed by actualities. Some young men do participate in 
violence. The problem is that portrayals of violence predominantly feature groups of angry 
young men shouting in the street, destroying property and physically harming people.52 
Yet, they almost never show the women53 and elders who cheer these men on and provide 
food and weapons, as happened during the 2007–2008 post-election violence in Mathare.54
Contrary to the ‘continued existence of folk constructions of Africa’,55 and African men, 
violence is not a typically ‘African’ or ‘male’ trait, but a universal phenomenon. In the ghetto, 
acts of violence—such as looting, raping and killing—are remarkably commonplace, and 
not only involve young men. During my fieldwork, for instance, I frequently encountered 
mob justice, i.e. a spontaneous group of men and women killing an alleged thief with stones 
and fire—so called ‘necklacing’ using a car tyre and gasoline. This type of violence shows 
that young men did not have monopoly over violence. It also reveals how divided Mathare 
residents are in relationship to police killings. Many local residents condemn police execu-
tions of criminal suspects, especially when they target young men from Mathare who steal 
outside the ghetto, whereas others support them and consider both police executions and 
mob justice as effective ways to deter youth from stealing inside the ghetto. In some cases, 
local police officers have teamed up with local residents to punish youth who steal inside 
the ghetto.56 This, however, is not a clear-cut position since distinctions between stealing 
inside or outside the ghetto are blurry at best. At present, tensions between different neigh-
bourhoods in Mathare—i.e. 4B and Bondeni/Shantit—centre on exactly this issue, which is 
becoming more and more politicised in the run-up to the 2017 General Elections. In fact, 
several residents and activists I spoke with interpret the sharp increase in executions since 
January 2016 along these lines.
Currently, a competition of epic proportions between the main opposition party and 
the government is taking shape nationwide. Mathare is a highly contested constituency in 
Nairobi because it allegedly has a high number of voters for both sides. As in any other 
political battleground in Kenya, electoral candidates and their local brokers make use of 
local tensions in Mathare to gain support. As it happens, popular discourse holds that many 
victims of crime live in 4B, an alleged opposition stronghold in Mathare, whereas most per-
petrators are imagined to reside in Shantit/Bondeni, purportedly a government support base 
in Mathare. These imaginaries also intersect with alleged ethnic identifications. Residents 
from 4B are mostly imagined as having Luo backgrounds, and the majority of people living 
in Shantit/Bondeni are widely considered to have Kikuyu backgrounds. Being for or against 
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police killings is thus used to mark boundaries between different neighbourhoods—i.e. the 
neighbourhood of ‘the perpetrators’ versus that of ‘the victims’—and between alleged ethnic 
identifications and concomitant political affiliations.
However, there is another layer to it. Politicians and their brokers from both sides usu-
ally work with local security groups—mostly comprising young men—to provide them 
with security and help mobilise voters. Such security groups in 4B are generally organised 
around the notion of defending their ‘village’ from the ‘criminals from the other side’—with 
which they mean Shantit/Bondeni. In organising security in 4B, these groups work together 
with local politicians and police officers. Similar groups in Shantit/Bondeni are typically 
organised around the notion of defending their ‘village’ against ‘attacks from the other side, 
the side of the informers’—with which they mean 4B. Since the expulsion of Mungiki from 
Bondeni in November 2006, an ongoing turf war between these politically affiliated security 
groups has led to frequent outbreaks of violence, especially around election time. In fact, 
the 2007–2008 post-election violence has to be analysed as part of this history.57 Some of 
the abovementioned activists explained to me earlier this year that the overt support of 
police killings by 4B’s security groups—for instance by posting pictures of dead young men 
allegedly shot by the police on Facebook—should thus also be seen as attempts to intimidate 
and provoke their counterparts in Shantit/Bondeni during a time in which power is rapidly 
shifting due to election politics.
As brought out in the above, many local ‘gangs’ in Nairobi turn out to be groups organised 
around local notions of work, which contribute to structuring processes of becoming men.58 
In contrast to dominant representations of such groups, many of these networks organise 
access to income generating activities which they dub work if it is long-term (i.e. brokering 
stolen goods, providing security, dealing drugs or distilling illegal alcohol) or hustling if it 
is short-term (i.e. fetching water, collecting garbage, chopping firewood).59 Many people in 
Mathare construct strict binaries, based on popular notions of respectability, between work 
and hustling on the one hand and crime on the other, such as stealing in and/or outside the 
ghetto. These notions of work, hustling and crime are thus based on dominant discourses 
of morality that are adapted to meet the local context. The aforementioned use of the term 
‘company’ also reflects this. In contrast to the term ‘company’, ‘gang’ is a term people in 
Mathare often only use to describe groups of young men who steal, especially those who 
steal inside the ghetto. All such groups, however, often overlap and shift, making boundaries 
between them rather indistinct and short lived, and members of either one or the other or 
both—at some point in time—may belong to the same.
The baze is an emic term which refers to a rather fluid network of friends—generally age 
mates who live in the same neighbourhood, and to the particular site where they mostly 
hang out.60 At the baze, they chat, smoke, drink, chew khat, gamble (using cards) and 
organise work, hustling and, sometimes, stealing opportunities together, and each baze 
has a particular name. Company members and young men involved in stealing can be 
part of the same baze, but not all baze members are company members and/or engaged in 
stealing. Moreover, not all bazes are spaces of economic activities—be it work, hustling or 
stealing, but all companies and groups of thieves are linked to, sometimes multiple, bazes. 
The bazes where I conducted my research in Bondeni and Kosovo were exclusively male, 
but there are also many gender-mixed or exclusively female bazes. In dominant imaginaries, 
concepts such as baze, company and ‘gang’ have become conflated and epitomised by the 
‘thug’ personae, making all of them targets for police brutality. Yet, the rather fluid groups 
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belonging to the bazes where I conducted most of my research can perhaps best be under-
stood as organisations of work61 within the informal economy.62
Political youth wings and vigilantes in Mathare
The majority of the current companies engaged in illegal alcohol, security provision, broker-
ing stolen goods and/or dealing drugs in Bondeni can be traced back to the early 1990s.63 
Kosovo is quite a recent neighbourhood in Mathare, hence most of the local companies here 
have roots in other areas. Interestingly, the companies and the bazes to which these groups 
belonged in both Bondeni and Kosovo are key to understanding the rise and demise of more 
political groups such as Mungiki in Mathare—which also often had strong components of 
work in the way they were organised locally. Yet, these companies and bazes have received 
very little attention in media and academia, overshadowed as they were by the spotlight 
on Mungiki groups. Accordingly, media representations of Mungiki groups largely shaped 
the popular imaginary of the ‘gang’ in dominant discourse, and as a result the government 
crackdown on Mungiki also affected these highly local groups. A closer look at these groups, 
however, also reveals a much more complex reality. Mungiki groups were widely considered 
to be unique because of their strong ethnic profile, reputed cruelty and widespread power 
through their vigilante practices within the public transport industry.64 Yet, these features 
were not exactly new to groups in these ghettos.
Kenya African National Union (KANU) youth wingers have been active in Mathare ever 
since independence in 1963 but grew to full power during the 1980s. The dominant, and 
later only, political party KANU deployed young men and women in ghettos like Mathare, 
and in many rural areas, since the 1960s. Their job in Mathare, for instance, was to arrest 
and to discipline petty thieves and chang’aa—i.e. illegal alcohol distillers, sellers and cus-
tomers—and to report cases of domestic violence and other neighbourhood disturbances 
to the local chief.65 Also, these groups claimed control of bus stations and routes in poorer 
regions of Nairobi and environs. Hence, the youth wingers exacted fees for security from 
drivers and conductors years before Mungiki groups took over this industry between 2002 
and 2007. Many KANU youth wingers were also involved in illegal activities, blurring an 
already thin line between state authority and criminal activities in Mathare. A more recent 
phenomenon, branded ‘vigilantism’ in dominant discourses,66 saw the rise of groups—
including both young men and women—that were in charge of security, for a fee, and that 
worked in conjunction with the local government authorities—be it the local branch of the 
main political party or the local chief. These security groups were often also involved in 
so-called illegal economic activities in Nairobi ghettos such as stealing, dealing drugs and 
brokering stolen goods.
In earlier times, all these groups mostly had multiple ethnic backgrounds, yet during the 
1990s similar vigilante-cum-political groups emerged that had particular ethnic profiles. 
The return of multi-party politics, from 1991 onwards, opened up a political space marked 
by intense electoral competition. Local political leaders of emerging oppositional political 
parties followed KANU’s example and also established youth wings in Mathare and in other 
Nairobi ghettos—or armies, jeshi in Kiswahili, as they were dubbed locally. These ‘armies’ 
carried names such as Baghdad Boys and Jeshi la Embakasi,67 and many—though not all—of 
these groups had members who had ethnic backgrounds similar to that of the politician with 
whom they were affiliated. These groups assisted their godfathers—‘Big Man or Woman’ in 
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Sheng—in politics, by mobilising crowds at rallies, disrupting rallies of opponents and using 
general intimidation tactics during elections. Many established themselves as vigilantes—i.e. 
security guards—in ghettos like Mathare for a fee.68 Similar to their predecessors, these 
groups were also involved in hijacking cars, armed robbery, dealing drugs, distilling illegal 
alcohol and brokering stolen goods. If all this was already going on, what then changed in 
2002 that sparked a sharp increase in unlawful killings by the police?
The rise and fall of Mungiki groups in Mathare between 2002 and 2008
The year 2002 marked the emergence of Mungiki groups in many Eastlands ghettos in 
Nairobi, such as Mathare, though they had existed long before this date. Between 2002 and 
2008, Mathare residents on multiple occasions described—and a few showed me—a ground 
called Centa in Eastleigh, just across from the ghetto alongside Juja road. They told me that 
criminal and Mungiki suspects—often imagined as one and the same—were executed here 
after being arrested by the police during night raids. This ground was a football field dur-
ing the day, but functioned as an execution ground at night, and many Mathare residents 
I spoke with told me they had lost relatives and friends here. Others had been executed in 
City Park or in Karura forest. I have also talked to several suspected Mungiki members who 
survived what they termed ‘death trips’ to Karura forest and who had witnessed the murder 
of friends at first hand. Not all young ghetto men who were executed were killed at night 
and out of sight. Others, like Silas and his two friends in the vignette at the beginning of this 
article, were murdered by the police during the day and in plain sight of everyone nearby.
A particularly violent conflict between Mungiki and another group called the Taliban,69 
resulting in the death of more than 20 people and many more injured, spurred the Kenyan 
government to outlaw a disparate array of groups in March 2002.70 It was unclear why 
certain groups were included in this list and what the exact legal status was of the ban 
(and consecutive bans in more recent years), but many ghetto residents referred to this 
announcement as the start of the increase in unlawful killings of young ghetto men by the 
police. This conflict had been more violent than previous ones, but the number of deaths 
was not the main reason these and other groups were banned and unlawful killings of young 
ghetto men increased. What was so exceptional about Mungiki to spark an increase in such 
executions by the police? To answer this question, we first need to look at the emergence 
of Mungiki groups in Mathare.
Mungiki groups gradually emerged in Mathare during the late 1990s, first apparently 
more as religious oriented groups and later more as vigilante groups with protection rackets 
and –highly shifting– local and national political affiliations.71 Around 2000, these groups 
started to fight the Taliban over control of public transport routes in Eastlands Nairobi.72 All 
these groups had a strong Kikuyu profile and were somehow linked to the national Mungiki 
movement.73 This movement was allegedly founded during the late 1980s, and was geared 
towards protecting the squatter communities with Kikuyu backgrounds during the clashes 
in Rift Valley Province that were instigated by the Moi Government during the 1990s. These 
clashes were aimed at ousting inhabitants with Kikuyu backgrounds, and hence ostensible 
opposition voters, from its strongholds.74 The violence brought about an influx of refugees, 
with mainly Kikuyu backgrounds, to poor urban areas such as Mathare in Nairobi, and 
with them came Mungiki members who then later established groups of their own in this 
ghetto. The Mungiki movement allegedly had ties to highly-placed politicians, mainly with 
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Kikuyu backgrounds, and also earned money through revenues from the many Mungiki 
groups operating in Nairobi ghettos, along certain public transport routes and, later, also 
in a few rural areas.75
Within a few years the local Mungiki groups controlled half of the Mathare ghetto.76 
These local Mungiki groups exacted taxes for public transport, for the right to distil illegal 
alcohol, for security, electricity, and even for access to sanitation. In contrast to the dominant 
perception at the time, however, the Mungiki groups were not such a unique phenomenon 
in Mathare or in other Nairobi ghettos. As said, vigilante groups, even with very specific 
ethnic profiles, had existed before in Mathare and in other ghettos, but one of the reasons 
why Mungiki groups received a lot of attention, from media and academics alike, had to 
do with the sudden ubiquity of Mungiki groups in Nairobi. Most Kenyans were taken by 
surprise at how quickly these groups spread, and how powerful they were.
Malik recounted in August 2008: ‘They came from outside. Mungiki brought security, 
they killed the big thugs, then other thugs they joined them, we had fear’. He narrated this to 
me a year after Mungiki had been expelled in Kosovo. This and the fact that he was talking 
to me, a white, older woman—even though he knew me very well—decidedly informed his 
attempt to distance himself from those who fully joined Mungiki, interestingly, by using 
the term ‘thug’. Malik had never fully joined out of fear, but he had worked closely with 
Mungiki, and many of his friends from the same company and baze had indeed joined as 
full members. He shared with me that Mungiki groups could not have emerged in Bondeni, 
and later in Kosovo, without collaborations with local companies. Many company members 
even shifted temporarily to join Mungiki because of the different opportunities these groups 
offered—not just related to economic activities but also to a sense of belonging. Interestingly, 
most companies in Bondeni and Kosovo continued to exist, and after the demise of the 
Mungiki groups former company members returned to their previous company for work. I 
observed the same during the rise and fall of a Taliban group in a part of Bondeni between 
January 2008 and late 2009. From a local perspective, companies turned out to be crucial in 
understanding how and why Mungiki, Taliban and other political groups came and went. 
I explore this further in my other work,77 but for now it must suffice to state that the inter-
actions between Mungiki groups and local companies led to their conflation in dominant 
discourses, which further legitimised police persecution of young ghetto men in general.
Today, Mungiki groups are pushed back to the fringes of everyday urban politics and 
economy, not completely eradicated but also not the force they once were. The Mungiki 
groups could not have taken control of entire ghetto areas, matatu routes and so on without 
powerful political backing, hence their demise has to be also understood as a direct conse-
quence of a dramatic shift in this backing.78 During the violent crackdown on Mungiki, the 
government threw a wide net and also killed many young men who were not even remotely 
involved with Mungiki. It is not hard to imagine that the same is taking place in relationship 
to the more contemporary executions of terrorist suspects. Having said this, executions of 
crime suspects cannot only be explained in connection to these broader dynamics. The above 
has shown that these executions also relate to local processes of security, crime and politics, 
which need further exploration, as these seem to be intensifying now in the run-up to the 
2017 General Elections. Above all, the structural killings of criminal suspects continue to be 
legitimised by the ‘othering’79 of young ghetto men as ‘thugs’, which is one of the processes 
of subjectivation at the heart of the dominant discourse on citizenship.
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Mathare is not Kenya
As came out in the above, young ghetto men were cast as ‘dangerous gangsters’, as ‘thugs 
for hire’80 and as figureheads in political struggles within the dominant discourse on citi-
zenship, and as such as non-citizens. Popular notions of belonging, central to the dominant 
discourse on citizenship,81 inform these modes of ‘othering’. With regard to citizenship here 
I mean who is imagined to belong to the Kenyan nation and who does not according to 
widely held perceptions and experiences. This notion of citizenship goes beyond legal status 
and aims to identify the differentiated access of particular social groups to civil rights and 
opportunities. Citizenship in Kenya remains defined by specific (time and space bound) 
power configurations based on age, gender, class, ethnic and local positions. Articulations 
of such intersected belongings in the dominant discourse on citizenship in Kenya continue 
to be shaped by the remnants of colonial assignations.82 Ensuing processes of subjectivation 
set in motion different trajectories of access to resources and (state) power in post-colo-
nial Kenya, and laid the foundations for current social divisions in Kenyan society.83 The 
mainstay of the dominant discourse on citizenship is the simultaneous configuration of the 
dominant position of men over women, and wealthy older urban men over poor younger 
and/or urban men.84
Imagining young and poor urban men as ‘dangerous criminals’ and as a ‘threat to public 
safety’ has been part of discourses on citizenship since the colonial era. For instance, during 
the time of emergency, between 1952 and 1958, one of the colonial framings of Mau Mau 
pointed at the danger of reckless young men (imagined as having predominantly Kikuyu 
backgrounds) who defied their own older and more moderate leaders.85 Since the colo-
nial era, young poor men, especially within urban areas such as Mathare, continued to be 
described, by media and politicians, as a threat to the current leadership and overall stability. 
An interesting historical continuity can be detected here. Mathare as a location of urban Mau 
Mau resistance during the 1950s was imagined as a criminal hub, a perception which reso-
nates with today’s notion of the ghetto. The continued spatial ‘othering’ of Mathare became 
ever more epitomised by the othering of, particularly, young men living here in recent years. 
This and other processes of othering—of women, of Muslims, of Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay 
and Transgender persons, of Kenyan Asians, of specific ethnic groups, etc.86—are central 
to conjuring up the Kenyan nation state and serve to legitimise the concentration of power 
in the hands of a small, ageing and predominantly male elite.
The above has demonstrated that young ghetto men have become the embodiment of 
the ‘thug’ in master narratives of threat. As such, killing young, poor ghetto men became 
increasingly conceptualised as ‘protecting us from them’, and marks out who belongs to the 
Kenyan nation and who does not in the most physical and brutal sense of the word. Yet, the 
concomitantly skewed representations of acts of violence by young ghetto men obscures the 
fact that despite such stereotypes many young ghetto men are victims instead of perpetrators 
of violence. Moreover, it omits the everyday violence of poverty, exclusion, police brutality 
and humiliation from which direct acts of violence emerge.87 This demonstrates that, along 
with ethnicity and gender, three other key markers of subjectivation play a significant role 
in the dominant discourse on citizenship: class, age and locality. These young ghetto men 
thus mark the unstable and highly contested boundaries of citizenship, national identifi-
cation and belonging,88 that continue to be marked—albeit in constantly shifting ethnic 
configurations—by ‘Big Men’. Within this still predominantly patriarchal system, these 
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young men are violently exploited, oppressed and confined to the ghetto. Thus, the system 
works to affirm the power of the political and business elites.
In response to being targets of extra-judicial killings by the police, many young men in 
Mathare imagine themselves as not belonging to the Kenyan nation, but only to the ghetto 
—mtaa in Sheng. A website made by a young man from Mathare that is called Mathare sio 
Kenya—which means ‘Mathare is not Kenya’ in Kiswahili—expresses this position quite 
strikingly. In such imaginaries, this urban locality stands in stark contrast to the ‘city’—tao in 
Sheng—with which they mean Nairobi city centre. Some even voice this sense of belonging 
to the ghetto and not to the nation state as ‘ghetto pride’. Taken in the dominant discourse 
as criminals who threaten the nation and deserve to be killed, these young men flip the 
meaning of non-citizenship to claim the moral upper hand. Instead of perpetrators, they 
take themselves and fellow ghetto residents to be victims of abusive authorities, and they 
take great pride in protecting ‘their community’ against such a predatory state. Nevertheless, 
this sense of pride does not withstand a continued longing shared by many young ghetto 
men to also belong to the Kenyan nation state and access related rights and opportunities.
Conclusion
This article explored the relationship between citizenship and police violence, particularly 
extra-judicial killings, with regard to young ghetto men in Mathare, a Nairobi ghetto. It first 
brought out the different groups of victims of most extra-judicial killings in Kenya over the 
past decade, i.e. Mungiki, terrorist and crime suspects, and discussed why especially police 
executions of crime suspects largely go unnoticed. The above has demonstrated that this, 
to a large extent, is tied to the way young ghetto men are imagined in dominant narratives 
of threat. Such imaginaries have informed the ‘normalisation’ of these executions in the 
everyday, which is evidenced by the lack of protest among the wider public. These men 
have become the embodiment of the ‘thug’ and as such are cast as a ‘threat to public safety’. 
Hence, killing ‘them’ became ever more imagined as protecting ‘us’, which highlights how 
such narratives of threat and concomitant processes of ‘othering’ shape, and are shaped 
by, processes of subjectivation within the dominant discourse on citizenship. Imagining 
these young ghetto men as ‘them’ and thus ultimately as non-citizens served to legitimise 
their killings by the police, allowing such executions to continue to the date of writing this 
article. Thus, the dominant discourse on citizenship produces the subject position of ‘thug 
as non-citizen’ which is ascribed to all young ghetto men, a process that is brutally affirmed 
by the act of killing them.
The young ghetto men I conducted research with tried to resist the allotted subject 
position of the ‘thug’ by attempting to adhere to ideal notions of manhood, such as the 
provider, and by constructing a position of ‘ghetto pride’. Taking a closer look at how these 
men negotiated such positions in extremely dire everyday circumstances also revealed the 
very different roles of groups that are often referred to as ‘gangs’ in dominant discourses. 
Away from such stereotypes, many of these groups turn out to be organised around local 
notions of work and hustling, and enable these men to achieve positions of manhood, even 
if rather fleetingly. As discussed, sensational media representations of Mungiki have signifi-
cantly informed the imaginary of the ‘thug’. However, the above showed that similar to local 
companies Mungiki and Taliban groups too can be understood as organisations of work 
and opportunities—including a sense of belonging, even if this does not completely grasp 
316  N. VAN STAPELE
all of the complexities involved. It is, thus, interesting to consider that, taking into account 
the long history of local groups with comparable characteristics, Mungiki groups—and to 
some extent also Taliban groups—were not as unique as often portrayed. Also, the fact that 
many local companies and individual company members temporarily joined such groups, to 
access the myriad opportunities these groups offered, helps us to further understand these 
groups in a different light. Alongside highly shifting political affiliations and junctures of 
violence, this understanding connects groups like Mungiki to the economic dynamics that 
gave rise to the local companies—which often also have local political affiliations of their 
own. Indeed, this may provide new avenues to further explore many of the groups popularly 
imagined as ‘gangs’ as self-organisations within the informal economy.
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